

# *A COGERAÇÃO COMO UM NOVO NEGÓCIO*

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# EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE

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- ASSOCIAÇÃO DE CONCESSIONÁRIAS AMERICANAS E EMPRESAS MULTINACIONAIS ATUANTES NO MERCADO DE ENERGIA.
- Defesa dos interesses dos associados em esfera federal e internacional.
- Expansão de oportunidades de mercado
- informações estratégicas relativas à indústria de energia em todo o mundo.

# O programa internacional

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- 44 associados internacionais em 21 países em todos os continentes.
  - Dispõe de informações estratégicas
  - incrementam o conhecimento de seus executivos
  - expandem os horizontes de seus negócios
  - maximizam seus investimentos
  - mantém suas equipes envolvidas com o mercado internacional.

# As vantagens da geração distribuída para sua empresa

- Vantagem estratégica
- ganhos econômicos e tarifários
- potencial de faturamento com novo produto
- o mercado prevê 5,8% de crescimento anual para os próximos 10 anos.
- O mercado prevê contínuo aumento de tarifas em US\$ .

# Considerações sobre o mercado brasileiro

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- Hoje, temos 33 medidas a implantar, pelo relatório de progresso no. 3, demandando investimentos de US\$ 40 bilhões em 4 anos, para gerar mais 26.000 MW.
- Convém lembrar que Capital não se impõe, capital se atrai:
  - a falta de regulação de hoje...
  - a contenção e distorção tarifária atual....
  - afasta o investidor de amanhã,
  - que provoca a crise no futuro próximo,
  - que explode as tarifas a seguir.

# As conclusões de uma pesquisa atual com 130 executivos do setor:

- é essencial a estabilidade e a definição dos marcos regulatórios para a atração de capitais nacionais e internacionais.
  - Lei 10438 reforça o papel estatal no setor e agrega novas distorções ao setor
  - o MAE ainda não funciona, há muitas ações judiciais.
  - O Acordo Geral sai em Julho, com a extinção das ações judiciais.
  - há lacuna de atribuições
  - há dificuldades da ANEEL com suas atribuições.

# A loucura tributária sobre energia:

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## ■ Do faturamento sobre energia elétrica:

- 32% de tributos diretos.
  - 8% de outros encargos setoriais.
  - 15,2% de custos operacionais.
  - 4,8 % de remuneração.
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- CONCLUSÃO:
  - aumento contínuo de tarifas para os próximos anos.

# Algumas boas notícias

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- legislação garante a estabilidade fiscal e parte da estabilidade financeira
- não há como romper os contratos por medida provisória.
- Em 8 anos, o investimento externo no Brasil já atinge US\$ 150 BI .
- 6 mil MW já entraram em operação de Abril de 2001 a Abril/2002.
- A interligação Sul-Sudeste está quase pronta.
- A sociedade acordou para o problema da energia.




# para pensar mais tarde!!

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- Investimentos da sociedade, como caderneta de poupança vinculada a projetos de energia
- eficiência energética é uma solução.
- Energias renováveis estão decolando.
- há US\$ 60 bilhões em recursos brasileiros no exterior.
- 20 milhões de brasileiros voluntários em programas sociais.
- O número de faculdades cresceu 90% em 5 anos.

# Prescription for the Wholesale Markets

# Generating Capacity Margins Dropping




# A Robust Generation Market Can Lower Prices, But . . .

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- Generation not keeping pace with demand -- margins dropping
- Crisis in confidence as a result of Enron – cancellations
- Siting problems
- Fuel diversity – challenges with each fuel
  - Coal -- certainty on environmental rules/policies
  - Nuclear -- waste storage and decommissioning
  - Gas -- infrastructure enhancement
  - Hydroelectric -- relicensing streamlining
  - Renewable and new technology – funding
- Need proper pricing signals
- Electric company formation / operation – barriers


# Transmission Investment Declined for ~ 20 Years



Dr. Eric Hirst, *Transmission Planning for a Restructured US Electric Industry*, EEI, 2001



# Transmission Congestion *Too Much Over Too Little!*



Dr. Eric Hirst, *Transmission Planning  
for a Restructured US Electric Industry*, EEI, 2001



# More Transmission Is Needed Too!

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## ■ Transmission system not keeping up with demand

- Transactions increased by **400%** over last 4 years
- Congestion increased over **300%** (Transmission Line Relief - TLRs)
- Very few transmission facilities expected over next decade
  - Investment decreasing by ~ **\$120 million/year**
  - **Quadruple** investment to maintain current level of adequacy this decade
- FERC estimates bottlenecks cost **\$12.6 billion/year**

## ■ Transmission siting and permitting must be expedited

## ■ Resolve legal / legislative / regulatory uncertainty

- Transmission pricing, tax and accounting laws, corporate structure and 3<sup>rd</sup> party liability, restructuring and mergers, Federal role in reliability, Regional Transmission Organization (RTO) formation, market power policies, unbundling and asset transfers



# Price Responsive Demand Needed

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## ■ Demand response can yield significant benefits:

- As a mechanism to avoid purchasing high cost energy
- By mitigating "market power"
- As a method of dealing with emergency situations

## ■ Some important issues

- Cost recovery - recovery of RTO imposed program costs
- RTO interference with state programs?
- Impact on supply / consumer contracts?
- Customer confusion – Who should customers call?
- Rate caps - how do we get the proper price signal to customers?
  - Real-time, TOU, average?      Unbundling energy from delivery?
- Information resources - metering, scheduling, customer interface, verification



# FERC – *A New Activist Role!*

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## ■ Chairman Pat Wood, III

- Pro-consumer, market-oriented vision of utility regulation
- Wants a seamless, national power marketplace realized through well functioning RTOs

## ■ “Well functioning markets depend on three key elements”

- Adequate infrastructure
- Clear and balanced rules that allow efficient trading (Market design)
- Effective oversight and enforcement

## ■ FERC (Staff) Vision Statement Released (Dec 17<sup>th</sup>)

- Anticipates fully unbundled markets
- No barriers to entry/exit
- Clear market power rules
- Market power oversight

# Retail Competition In The States

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*What's Happening?*

*What's Needed?*

# California – A Turning Point In Restructuring

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## ■ Flawed market design

- No long term fixed cost power contracts
- All power priced at highest cost transaction
- Utilities required to sell to/buy from Power Exchange for 5 years
- Overexposure to spot market 50-60% unhedged (others 10-20%)
- Divestiture of fossil fired plants

## ■ Allegations of supply-side gaming and exercise of market power

## ■ Underdeveloped demand-side responsiveness

## ■ Unforeseen ramifications of Provider of Last Resort (POLR) obligations

# California Aftershocks

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- **Raised legislator, regulator, consumer advocate concerns about benefits of competition *verses* cost-of-service regulation**
  - Stopped, slowed, reversed restructuring in other states
  - Changed company strategies
    - Rebundling, asset transfers/spin-offs, return to rate based generation
  - Increased pleas for municipalization
- **Raised Wall Street's concerns about utility business risk**
  - PG&E bankruptcy, volatile wholesale prices, gas price spikes, etc.
  - Mounting concerns over burden of POLR and other residual obligations
  - Enron fueled the fires
- **Prompted FERC / state actions**
  - FERC - Price mitigation, market oversight and enforcement
  - State – State buying entity, calls for conservation, expedited siting, some rate incentives

# State Restructuring – California Slowing the Pace

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- **Restructuring movement affected**
  - North Carolina
  - No longer considering restructuring – AL
  
- **Start delays**
  - Start date – AR, NM, OR, WV
  - Indefinitely delayed -- OK
  
- **Transition period**
  - Extended – MT, NH
  
- **Divestiture mandate**
  - Rescinded – NV
  
- **Others stayed the course**
  - Texas, Virginia


# Maybe It's Too Early To Judge?

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- The transition has not be that smooth or as complete as expected
- The emerging drop in wholesale prices may once again turn the retail markets around
- Retail competition is not an overnight change
  - Retailers trying to figuring out their place in a low margin service (Green power?)
  - Consumers looking but California's problems has put a chill in the air
    - Don't forget – consumers must warm to this “new product” and fell comfortable
    - We can't expect 40% switching rates overnight
- Switching rates in many states depend upon a legislative guess at an appropriate rate (generally a discount from a rate in effect on a date certain less 5-10%)

# Different Goals -- Different Results

## Switching Rates



# Supplier Economics

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## ■ Niagara Mohawk example

- Acquisition cost \$50 per customer
- Average residential bill for commodity = \$16/mo or \$192/yr
- Average retail competitive margin about 5%
- Average annual profit = \$9.60/yr

## ■ Break even for a supplier = 5+ years

## ■ Average telecom customer length of stay = 2 years

## ■ Competitive suppliers must bring value!

- Lower prices, green power, other value added services



# Balancing Conflicting Goals

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## ■ *Protect Consumers*

- Price caps, price reductions

vs.

- Below market rates killed the retail market

## ■ *Promote Competitors*

- “Jump Start” with high price-to-beat

vs.

- Tripling incumbent’s rates

## ■ How do we promote an efficient market?

## ■ What is politically correct?

# Safety Net Service *or Provider of Last Resort (POLR)*

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*Consumer Protection is the Lynchpin*

# Consumers Need A Safety Net

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## ■ Consumers are demanding Safety Net Services

- Continuity of service for those who choose not to switch
- A place to land when a supply relationship ends
- Rates that provide some shield from volatile wholesale markets
- A provider of last resort when the markets don't meet their needs

## Safety-net service price is key to retail market evolution

## ■ POLR obligations riskier than anticipated

- Customers returning when market prices increase or suppliers leave market
- Utilities must take back customers even at a loss!

# Importance Of Safety Net Services

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- SNS can determine if consumers have adequate protection during the transition
  - A place to stay, a place to return to, a rate that is stable
- SNS can determine if suppliers go bankrupt
  - Suppliers can bear immense risks w/o commensurate returns
  - Buying from volatile wholesale markets – selling under a cap
- SNS can determine if competitors will enter or leave market
  - Fixed rates during high wholesale markets discourage retail entry, encourages retail exit – *creates wealth transfer not efficiency gains*

# Importance Of Safety Net Services

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- SNS can determine if legislators move forward or backward
  - SNS can provide a comfort level to move forward
- SNS can determine if long term goal of lower prices will be met
  - Link between encouraging competition and consumer protection
  - Competitive retail markets can drive down the costs at wholesale
- SNS can determine if demand for new retail risk management services arises
  - Fixed rates can dull customer interest in using price-responsive, demand-reduction technologies
  - Prevent necessary demand elasticity from developing in spot market

# SNS Not Really Understood

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- POLR was the “foot in the door” utilities wanted
- POLR was the “political cover” that legislators wanted
  - Legislators/regulators wanted to protect consumers and get reelected
- POLR was a “free option” consumers and marketers want
  - Customers might be able to return without penalty to get low rates
  - Marketers could send customers back when wholesale prices increased

## We found POLR is a “risky” business -- that many avoid

Never quite sure who will be your customers

Never quite sure how much power to buy

Never quite sure to sign long-term contracts

Buying from volatile wholesale markets

– selling under capped retail rates

# Demand Response

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*California could have been avoided  
if consumers saw real costs  
and responded!*

# Getting Demand Reductions

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- Expose residential customers to some of the marginal cost of power
- May need to push larger more experienced customers out from under long term price protection
  - They have experience with energy supply procurement and risk management
- Reconsider problematic rate freezes
  - Fixed by legislature for a long period of time
  - Often no relationship to competitive market prices
  - May provide short-term “protection” with real longer-term high cost consequences
  - Allows “gaming” which doesn’t create efficiency gains but merely wealth transfers



# Price Response Demand Needed

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- **Demand response can yield significant benefits:**
  - As a mechanism to avoid purchasing high cost energy
  - By providing a "hedge" for POLR/SNS obligations
  - By mitigating "market power"
  - As a potential new business opportunity
  - As a method of dealing with emergency situations & increasing reliability
- **Demand response may become a multi-billion \$ market**
  - The "savings" numbers are large!
  - New opportunities to create customer value
- **FERC developing new national policy**
  - FERC and RTO control of demand response programs
  - Develop regional, standardized markets
  - FERC public meeting February 14, 2002, GigaNOPR

# Demand Response - Challenges

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## ■ Cost recovery

- How will states deal with RTO/Congressional imposed program costs?

## ■ Delivery interference

- How will RTO programs be coordinated with current utility programs – especially those designed to help control distribution loads?

## ■ Supply interference

- How will RTO or other third party load reductions affect existing supplier contracts?

## ■ Customer confusion

- Who should customers call to identify demand response opportunities?

## ■ Rate caps

- Why would customers participate in the absence of upside risk?

# A Viable EEI Strategy

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- **Get market design right**
  - Vague rules, incomplete policies promote uncertainty
- **Adopt ratemaking / pricing that promote infrastructure enhancement**
  - Adequate generating capacity
  - Robust and secure transmission and delivery systems
- **Fix retail market problems**
  - Address Provider of Last Resort issues
  - Support price responsive demand
- **Enhance energy security by integrating cyber, physical and operations security**
- **Restore confidence in accounting and financial reporting**

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